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Abstract
We study one of the many aspects of privacy, which is referred to as data anonymity, in a formal context.
Data anonymity expresses whether some piece of observed data, such as a vote, can be attributed to a
user, in this case a voter. We validate the formal treatment of data anonymity by analyzing a well-known
electronic voting protocol.
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1 Introduction
The privacy of users of electronic services is certainly not a matter of course. Elec-
tronic services like loyalty schemes and payment systems (e-auctions and electronic
tolling for instance) may have severe consequences in the ﬁeld of privacy. Currently
foreseen developments like RFID [4] lead to a growing concern in this respect.
In the framework of “privacy” several aspects can be discerned. In the Common
Criteria [31] the functional class FPR distinguishes between four aspects of privacy:
anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability. Anonymity, the topic
of our research, ensures that a someone may use a resource or service without
disclosing its identity. Pseudonymity ensures that someone may use a resource or
service without disclosing its identity, but can still be hold accountable for that
use. Unlinkability ensures that a someone may make multiple uses of resources or
services without others being able to link these uses together. Unlinkability diﬀers
from pseudonymity in the sense that, although in pseudonymity the user is also
not known, relations between diﬀerent actions can be provided. Unobservability
ensures that someone may use a resource or service without others, especially third
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parties, being able to observe that the resource or service is being used. Informal
deﬁnitions, as the above, are essential for the understanding of the diﬀerent notions
of privacy, but will only allow to investigate a system informally. In addition to [31],
informal deﬁnitions of anonymity are given in [34,16,42].
Concerning formal deﬁnitions of anonymity several ways of expressing anonymity
have been proposed in the literature. Halpern and O’Neill [33] and also Syver-
son, Stubblebine and Gray [51,27] deﬁne information-hiding properties in terms of
knowledge known to the agents of the system. They formalize information-hiding
requirements and in particular anonymity. Reasoning about these properties is pos-
sible using epistemic logic. Hughes and Shmatikov [30] describe the behaviour of
a system as a set of functions. Information-hiding properties like anonymity are
formalized by means of the knowledge an attacker has about these functions. In
this respect Hughes and Shmatikov talk about the function view of the attacker.
The authors show that the function view framework is able to specify information
hiding properties for any protocol formalism and arbitrary attacker models. Infor-
mation theoretic approaches to characterize anonymity and unlinkability aspects
are described, e.g., in articles written by Serjantov and Danezis [47], Diaz et al. [22]
and by Steinbrecher and Ko¨psell [49].
Another way of expressing forms of anonymity is done by means of process al-
gebras. Schneider and Sidiropoulos [46] use CSP when proposing a deﬁnition of
anonymity. They deﬁne anonymity with respect to a set A of events. Anonymity
with respect to A means that if any event in A occurs, it could equally well have been
any other event in A. In [37], following Pﬁtzmann et al. [42], the present authors
give a formal deﬁnition of anonymity by introducing the concept of an anonymity
group AG. An anonymity group precisely indicates a group of users who are identi-
cal from the viewpoint of an intruder. An intruder cannot distinguish a certain user
from other users of the anonymity group. Subsequently, in [37], it was analyzed to
what extent and under what conditions the onion routing network [26,50,52] realized
“anonymity” of users making use of the network. Probabilistic analysis of protocols
for network anonymity, along the lines of work by Shmatikov [48] for Crowds [44],
for the path set-up in Onion Routing [50] and Tarzan [24] has been reported in [3].
In this article it is shown that there exists another aspect of anonymity not
formally addressed in articles [46] and [37]. There the focus is on the deﬁnition of
what can be called control anonymity. This refers to hiding the originator of an
event. This anonymity aspect plays an important role in anonymizing communica-
tion networks.
When considering other systems (e-voting systems for instance) one wants to
prove that some piece of information (a speciﬁc vote) cannot be related to its
originator (i.e. the voter). In other words, the originator of data must be kept
secret. This property is called data anonymity here. In order to reason about data
anonymity we need a model where it is not only possible to reason about the occur-
rence of events but where it is also possible to reason about the information within
an event. In other words, a more sophisticated model is needed than the models
introduced in [46] and [37]. In this paper we will concentrate on data anonymity
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and deﬁne a formal framework to reason about this concept.
As already mentioned, data anonymity plays an essential role in voting systems.
Electronic voting systems aim to provide a convenient, eﬃcient and secure facility
for recording and tallying votes. E-voting can be used in order to realize elections
at a small local scale such as share holder meetings to full-scale national elections.
Lipmaa [36] discerns two instances of e-voting: kiosk voting (voting in some ﬁxed
location using special hardware) or Internet voting using generally available devices,
e.g. a PC or a mobile phone. In the literature several sets of requirements are
found applicable to e-voting schemes [6,25,20]. These requirements are not identical.
In [19] Cranor and Cytron made a survey of the literature and formulated four
security related core properties.
accuracy (1) It should not be possible to alter votes. (2) It should be impossible
to cause a situation where a valid vote is not taken into account. (3) On the other
hand, an invalid vote should not be counted in the ﬁnal tally.
invulnerability (1) Only eligible voters are allowed to vote. (2) These voters are
only allowed to vote once.
veriﬁability Everyone should be able to verify independently that counting of the
votes has been done correctly.
privacy (1) It is not possible for anyone to link a vote to a voter. (2) Moreover, a
voter cannot prove that she voted in a speciﬁc manner.
In order to fulﬁll the above mentioned requirements the designers of e-voting
systems have devised security protocols between diﬀerent entities in the system.
The goal of these protocols is to guarantee that the system fulﬁlls the requirements
even in the presence of an intruder. It is clear that our notion of data anonymity
refers to the ﬁrst part of the privacy requirement.
Broadly spoken, two groups of e-voting schemes can be discerned: (i) schemes
that use homomorphic encryption (see, for example, [6,17,18,29]); (ii) schemes re-
quiring an anonymous channel which is used to hide the identity of the voter when
casting his vote (including [14,25,40,11]).
The voting scheme of Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [25] – which we concentrate
on and which we refer to hereafter as the FOO voting scheme – makes use of blind
signatures. In voting schemes using blind signatures, the voter obtains a token from
the Administrator, which is a message blindly signed by the Administrator. After
this registration phase, the voter can unblind the token and send his encrypted vote
(signed by the administrator) to the Counter via an anonymous channel. Finally,
the voter sends her decryption key – again via an anonymous channel – to the
counter. After decryption, the counter adds the vote to the tally. The complete
e-voting protocol will both informally and formally be described in Section 3 below.
As said before, the FOO scheme makes use of an anonymous channel. In their
paper Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta do not formulate explicit requirements concerning
the anonymous channel however. Several anonymous channels have been proposed
and analyzed. We mention [12,44,41,32,26,50,52] and [21,43].
Informal analysis of the FOO voting scheme [25,45] indicates that it fulﬁlls the
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data anonymity requirement. Herschberg, Cranor and Cytron perform informal
analyses of the voting systems EVOX and Sensus [28,19], that are based on FOO.
Herschberg [28] concludes that in the EVOX system the data anonymity aspect is
only compromised if the anonymous channel is broken, that is if the channel reveals
information about the origin of votes to the counter. Cranor and Cytron [19] argue
that the system Sensus fulﬁlls the ﬁrst part of the privacy requirement and does not
realize the second. In other words, Cranor argues that Sensus fulﬁlls data anonymity
whereas it does not prevent a voter to show that he voted in a certain way. In this
paper we will formally analyze the FOO voting scheme. More speciﬁcally, we will
verify to what extent FOO is in line with the given deﬁnition of data anonymity.
In their paper [35], Kremer and Ryan present a formal analysis of three security
aspects of the FOO voting protocol. Fairness and eligibility are proven using the
ProVerif tool [8,9], while for privacy they give a manual proof in the applied pi
calculus [1,2]. Their privacy proof consists of verifying that two systems are obser-
vationally equivalent. In the ﬁrst system, voter V1 has vote v1 and voter V2 has
vote v2, while in the second system voter V1 has vote v2 and voter V2 has vote v2.
If these systems cannot be distinguished by an observer, the voters and their votes
are unlinkable. This is reminiscent to the control anonymity of the permutation
based approach of [46].
In [39] Nielsen, Andersen and Nielson present an analysis of the FOO protocol
using the LySa calculus. The LySa calculus is a dialect of the π-calculus centered
around the concept of a global network [10]. In [39] the FOO protocol is formalized
with LySa. It is argued that the protocol satisﬁes the requirements of accuracy and
veriﬁability, as well as democracy and fairness. For anonymity, the unlinkability of
voter and vote is considered, but not proven formally.
The main diﬀerence between the above approaches and ours is that we deﬁne
the attribution set of a voter (complementary to the anonymity set), which contains
all votes that can possibly be attributed to a voter. This allows us to measure the
anonymity of a voter, whereas the approach of Kremer and Ryan provides a yes/no
answer. In the case of the FOO protocol the attribution set is a useful notion,
since Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta are not completely clear about the status of the
synchronization points they mention. Are these synchronizations required for the
protocol to work? Are there any possible alternative synchronization points that will
do? We will be able to analyze such questions after determining the attribution sets
of the FOO protocol without synchronization points. Our approach also supports to
design alternative approaches to increase the attribution set without providing full
anonymity still. Such practical anonymity is attractive for larger scale application
and may be achievable without the mentioned synchronization points.
Our formalization of the FOO voting scheme exploits an ACP style process
algebra [5,23,7]. In the modeling of [35], the anonymous channel is not made explicit.
In the applied pi calculus, every channel is anonymous unless input and output
can be explicitly linked. By explicitly modeling the anonymous channel here, we
take the opposite stance. Therefore, we can formally show that the level of data
anonymity of the FOO voting scheme depends on two items: (i) the behaviour of
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the anonymous channel; (ii) the way of synchronization after the registration phase.
Our formal analysis reveals that from the viewpoint of data anonymity these items
are interrelated. If no synchronization takes place after the registration phase, data
anonymity can only be obtained if extra requirements are put on the anonymous
channel. In the case voters may only start voting after everyone has registered, the
anonymous channel may be less sophisticated. Finally, as explained in Section 5,
our analysis suggests a weakness in case the publication medium is compromised.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a formal deﬁnition of
data anonymity. In Section 3 we describe and specify the FOO voting scheme. Sec-
tion 4 provides a characterization of anonymity of voters in the FOO voting scheme
in terms of attribution sets, whereas Section 5 presents the resulting vulnerability
analysis. In Section 6 we discuss conclusions and future research.
2 Data Anonymity Framework
Let Data, Keys, Nonces and Users, ranged over by d, k, n and u, be the primitive
classes of (sensitive) data, keys, nonces and users. The class Terms of terms, ranged
over by ϕ, is given by the BNF
ϕ ::= d | k | n | u | (ϕ,ψ) | {ϕ}k | [ϕ ]u
So, a term is either a primitive element, a pair of terms, the encryption of a term ϕ
with the key k, or the term ϕ attributed to the user u. The attribution construc-
tion [ϕ ]u is used to associate a term with a user. In particular, we will be interested
in the sensitive data that can be linked to a speciﬁc user. We use d ⊆u ϕ to denote
that the datum d occurs in subterm [ψ ]u of the term ϕ.
We will use the construct [ϕ ]u in a process description to indicate with respect
to which data we are interested in anonymity. Protocols are modeled such that
none of the agents (including the intruder) can inspect or modify the attribution.
It should be considered as a construct at the meta-level; its sole purpose is to
facilitate veriﬁcation.
The class Event of events, ranged over by e, consists of triples 〈sender, receiver, ϕ〉
representing the communication of the term ϕ from the user sender to the user
receiver. Thus, Event = Users × Users × Terms. In case e = 〈sender, receiver, ϕ〉,
we use msg(e) to denote the term ϕ. In a given setting we ﬁx a class Obs ⊆ Event
of observables.
The class Traces of traces, given by Traces = Event∗ and ranged over by t,
consists of all ﬁnite traces of events. The semantics of a system S is given by the set
of traces traces(S) ⊆ Traces. We refer to traces(S) as the trace set of the system S.
The function obs : Traces → Traces is deﬁned by
obs(ε) = ε
obs(e · t) = e · obs(t) if e ∈ Obs
obs(e · t) = obs(t) if e /∈ Obs.
Clearly, for any t ∈ Traces, it holds that obs(t) ∈ Obs∗. We use the notation ϕ ∈ t
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for a term ϕ and trace t if, for some sender sender and receiver receiver the event
〈sender, receiver, ϕ〉 is an event of t. We use the notation d ∈u t for a datum d and
trace t if d ⊆u ϕ for some term ϕ ∈ t. We write, for a trace t, ⊥ ∈u t if for no
datum d it holds that d ∈u t. We use a as typical element of Data⊥ = Data ∪ {⊥}.
The class Know of knowledge sets, ranged over by K, is the collection of sub-
sets of terms, i.e. Know = P(Terms). For a particular situation we ﬁx a knowl-
edge set I ∈ Know called the initial intruder knowledge. The auxiliary function
know : Know × Traces → Know, to be given in a minute, returns for a knowledge
set K and trace t the knowledge that is built up starting from the knowledge K
along the trace t. First, we need a notion of closure for knowledge sets. We say that
the term ϕ can be derived from the knowledge set K, notation K 	 ϕ, if ϕ can be
derived from K by repetitive use of the derivation rules in Table 1.
ϕ, ψ 	pair (ϕ,ψ) ϕ, k 	enc {ϕ}k
(ϕ,ψ) 	left ϕ {ϕ}k, k 	dec ϕ
(ϕ,ψ) 	right ψ [ϕ ]u 	user ϕ
Table 1: Knowledge derivation rules
The closure closure(K) of a knowledge set K is then given by
closure(K) = { ϕ | K 	 ϕ }.
Based on this notion of closure, the function know can be given by
know(K, ε) = K
know(K, e · t) = know(J, t)
where J = closure(K ∪ {msg(e)}).
Note that the accumulation of knowledge in the deﬁnition above, ignores sender
and receiver roles. So, all communication of a trace can be observed. To compensate
for this, we use the function obs to prevent that particular traﬃc is collected.
In order to deal with encrypted terms we introduce the notion of tagging, an
auxiliary technical mechanism to mark terms that cannot be decrypted by the
observer or intruder. In essence, with keys k, ,m not in the particular knowledge
set, it helps to distinguish, for terms ϕ, ψ and ρ, the two traces {ϕ}k · {ψ} from
{ρ}m · {ρ}m while identifying the two traces {ϕ}k · {ψ} and {ψ} · {ϕ}k. First
we introduce the class Tags of tags with typical element τ . The class TagTerms
is constructed similar to the class Terms but with Tags added as a new primitive
ingredient. Thus, TagTerms, also ranged over by ϕ, is given by the BNF
ϕ ::= d | k | n | u | τ | (ϕ,ψ) | {ϕ}k | [ϕ ]u.
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The class TagTraces is the collection of ﬁnite strings of tagged events, i.e. ﬁnite
strings of triples 〈sender, receiver, ϕ〉 where ϕ ∈ TagTerms. A tagging is an injec-
tive mapping θ : Terms → Tags. Given a knowledge set K and a tagging θ, the
interpretation function intθK : Terms → TagTerms is given as follows:
intθK(p) = p for p = d, k, n, u
intθK((ϕ,ψ)) = (int
θ
K(ϕ), int
θ
K(ψ))
intθK({ϕ}k) = {int
θ
K(ϕ)}k if k ∈ K
intθK({ϕ}k) = θ({ϕ}k) if k /∈ K
intθK([ϕ ]u) = [ int
θ
K(ϕ) ]u.
So, if a term ϕ is encrypted with a key k that does not belong to the knowledge set
under consideration, the composed term {ϕ}k is interpreted as a tag, viz. the tag
θ({ϕ}k) ∈ Tags yielded by the tagging θ. Now, two traces t, t
′ ∈ Traces are consid-
ered equivalent with respect to a knowledge set K, notation t ∼K t
′, if they yield the
same knowledge and are equal upto renaming of tags, i.e. know(K, t) = know(K, t′)
and there exists a bijection β : Tags → Tags such that intθL(t) = int
β◦θ
L (t
′), for any
tagging θ and L = know(K, t).
For example, for traces t1 = {d1}k ·d2 · {d3}, t2 = {d3} ·d2 · {d1}k, a knowledge
set K such that k,  /∈ K, and an arbitrary tagging θ, we have intθK(t1) = θ({d1}k) ·
d2 ·θ({d3}) = τ1 ·d2 ·τ3 where τ1 = θ({d1}k) and τ3 = θ({d3}). If β : Tags → Tags is
a bijection of tags that switches τ1 and τ3, we obtain int
β◦θ
K (t2) = β(t3) · d2β(t1) =
τ1 · d2 · τ3. Hence, t1 ∼K t2. On the other hand, no bijection γ : Tags → Tags
will, assuming τ1 = τ3, verify γ(τ1) = τ1 and γ(τ3) = τ1. So, for t1 above and
t3 = {d1}k · d2 · {d1}k, we have t1 ∼Kt3.
The idea behind tagging is that diﬀerent bit strings in diﬀerent runs of the
system can represent the same encrypted information. The diﬀerence can be due
to non-essential phenomena, in particular a diﬀerent choice of nonces in the other
run. The identiﬁcation of bitstrings does not make sense within the same system
run where diﬀerent bit strings represent really diﬀerent data.
Finally, we are in a position to give the deﬁnition of our notion of an attribution
set.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let S be a system with set of traces traces(S), set of observ-
ables Obs and initial intruder knowledge I. The attribution set ASt(u) of a user u
with respect to the trace t ∈ traces(S) is given by
ASt(u) = { a | ∃t
′ ∈ traces(S) : obs(t) ∼I obs(t
′) ∧ a ∈u t
′ }.
Thus, given a system run t, a datum d can be attributed to user u if for some
trace t′, that is the same as the trace t from the intruder’s perspective, i.e. t ∼I t
′,
d is in fact associated with u, i.e. d occurs in a subterm that is associated with u in
some message in t′.
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For instance, if u is a voter and t is a run of a voting protocol, then u’s vote
is anonymous in this run if from the viewpoint of the intruder every collected vote
could have been attributed to u. This is the case if ASt(u) contains all votes collected
in t.
The special element ⊥ can be assigned to a user u if in a trace t′, observational
equivalent to the trace t, no datum d is associated with the user u.
In case traces(S) = { t1, t2, t3 } where t1 = [{d1}k ]u · [d2 ]v · {[d3 ]w}, t2 =
{[d3 ]u} · [d2 ]v · {[d1 ]u}k, t3 = {[d1 ]u}k · [d2 ]v · {[d1 ]w}k and d2 = k,  /∈ I, we have,
for user u, ASt1(u) = { d1, d3 } as d1 ⊆u [d1 ]u ∈ t1, 1 ∼I t2 and d3 ⊆u {[d3 ]u} ∈ t2.
For user v it holds that ASt1(v) = {d2} as only d2 is associated with v. Also, for
user w, we have ASt1(w) = {d3} is a singleton. In t2 no data is associated with w,
whereas the trace t3 is not observably equivalent to the reference trace t1.
3 The FOO Voting Scheme
In this section we will present the voting scheme proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto and
Ohta in 1992. First, we give an informal explanation, that is used as a basis for an
formal description that follows.
3.1 Informal Description
In this section we will explain the electronic voting protocol proposed by Fujioka,
Okamoto and Ohta [25], also known as the FOO voting scheme. This scheme is
claimed to satisfy a number of security requirements, one of which is privacy of
the voter. We will use the informal representation of the protocol in the Message
Sequence Chart in Figure 1 to explain the protocol. The symbols occurring in the
explanation are summarized in Table 2.
The protocol describes the communication between an administrator, a number
of voters and a counter. The role of the administrator is to check if the voter is
eligible to vote and to sign the (blinded) ballot of the voter. The role of the counter
is to collect all (anonymous) ballots and to publish them.
We focus on the protocol interactions of an individual voter. Voter v starts
by selecting his random secret key k(v) and a random nonce n(v) and he ﬁlls in
his ballot b(v). By encrypting his ballot with his key, he constructs a committed
ballot cb. At a later stage the voter will make his ballot public by (anonymously)
providing cb and k(v). Next, the voter blinds his ballot with his secret nonce, which
yields bcb. For this purpose, he uses the blinding operation denoted by ∗. In order
to ensure that this is his blinded ballot, he signs the result, which gives sv.
The voter sends his identity, the blinded committed ballot and the signed blinded
committed ballot to the administrator in order to allow the administrator to check
that the voter is (still) eligible to vote and to verify v’s signature. The administrator
acknowledges the received ballot by signing it and returning the signed blinded
committed vote sa to the voter. The signing algorithm used by the administrator
is a so-called blinding signature technique [13]. The purpose is that the voter can
obtain a signed committed ballot from the signed blinded committed ballot by
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v voter identity
b(v) voter v’s ballot
k(v) voter v’s key
n(v) voter v’s nonce
cb {b}k(v) committed ballot
bcb cb ∗ n(v) blinded committed ballot
sv sigv(bcb) blinded committed ballot signed by v
sa siga(bcb) blinded committed ballot signed by a
check(v) can v (still) vote?
verifyx(p, sp) is sp indeed p signed by x?
scb = sa/n(v) siga(cb) committed ballot signed by a
L1 public list of encrypted votes
L2 public list of opened votes
Table 2: Symbols used
applying the unblinding operator (denoted by /). Formally, this requires that the
signing and blinding operations commute.
Therefore, after verifying the signature of the administrator, the voter can de-
duce scb, which is his committed ballot signed by the administrator. After this, the
role of the administrator ends and the voter communicates to the counter. Messages
sent from the voter to the counter go via an anonymous channel, so that the identity
of the sender of the messages cannot be retrieved.
The voter sends his committed ballot cb and its signed version scb to the counter,
who veriﬁes that it is indeed signed by the administrator. He stores the received
information from all voters in the list L1 and after all voters have voted (or after
some deadline has passed), he publishes this list. Every voter can now verify that
his committed ballot is in the list and sends the key to open the committed ballot
to the counter (again using the anonymous channel). The counter opens the ballots
and ﬁnally publishes the second list L2, containing all open ballots.
Note that we only explained the main line of the protocol. We did not specify
exactly what happens if one of the checks fail due to an attempt to disrupt the
voting by one of the participants. The interested reader is referred to [25] for the
details.
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Figure 1: The FOO e-voting protocol.
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3.2 Formal Speciﬁcation
Next, we provide a formal speciﬁcation of the FOO voting scheme in process algebra
(see, e.g., [5,23,7]). This process algebra allows us to give a compact and formal
speciﬁcation of the set of all traces of the FOO voting scheme. However, it should
be noted that, our treatment of anonymity is not tied to any particular speciﬁcation
formalism, as long as it supports reasoning about traces.
For the reader who is not familiar with the chosen speciﬁcation language, we
summarize the meaning of the constructs used. A process is speciﬁed by means
of a (possibly recursive) equation. A process may be parametrized by a number
of data values. Processes can be combined using operators. We use · to denote
sequential composition, + to denote non-deterministic choice, Σx∈X to denote the
generalization of + over an index set X, ‖ to denote (interleaved) parallel execu-
tion, and ‖x∈X to denote the generalization of ‖ over a index set X. The parallel
composition operator also provides a means to synchronize two processes by syn-
chronizing communicating events. The deﬁnition of the communication function
takes the form a | b = c, which expresses that if events a and b occur in parallel,
they will result in event c. In order to encapsulate partial communications (i.e. to
force synchronization of events), the encapsulation operator ∂H is used, where H is
the set of communicating events that have to synchronize.
Apart from these operators at the process level, we will also need some operators
and additional data types at the data level. Most of these have already been deﬁned
above. In addition we deﬁne types List1, List2, and Buﬀer to contain lists of pairs,
lists of triples, and multisets of terms, respectively. We use the operator ⊕ to denote
adding elements to a list as well as to a buﬀer. The deletion of an element is denoted
by . We denote projection on the n-th element of a tuple by πn, and we extend
this notation to lists of tuples in the obvious way. By V and Ballots we denote the
set of all (potential) voters, and all ballots, respectively. The voters play the role of
the users as introduced in Section 2.
Since the informal description of the protocol does not specify the precise charac-
teristics of the anonymous channel (surprisingly, no standard deﬁnition is available
in the literature) and the publication medium, we will have to take some design
decisions in this respect. Thus, besides the three processes mentioned in the infor-
mal speciﬁcation, we will deﬁne two more processes, representing the anonymous
channel and the publication medium.
Therefore, we consider processes
Admin(S), Counter(L1, L2), Channel(B), Publisher(L1, L2),
and a family of processes Voter(v), for L1 ∈ List1, L2 ∈ List2, S ⊆ V, B ∈
Buﬀer, and v ∈ V. In addition, we use the subprocesses Counter′, Publisher′, and
Publisher′′. Using shorthand notation c, a, ch, p for these processes, we denote the
set of sources and destinations for messages by Dest = { c, a, ch, p } ∪V.
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Possible events are taken from the alphabet
E = { sx→y(ϕ), rx→y(ϕ) | x, y ∈ Dest, ϕ ∈ Terms }.
Event sv→a(ϕ), for instance, means that voter v sends a message ϕ, apparently to
the administrator. Likewise, rch→c(ϕ) means that the counter receives a message
ϕ, apparently coming from the channel.
In the formal description, we will use shorthand notation cb for {b}k, bcb for
cb ∗ n, sv for sigv(bcb), sa for siga(bcb), and scb for sa/n(v).
We strive to obtain a minimal speciﬁcation by leaving out all exceptional be-
haviour. Having understood the informal description of the protocol in the previous
section, the formal algebraic speciﬁcation is relatively easy to read. However, we
will explain some of the intricacies of the design decisions that we made.
Voter(v) =
∑
b∈Ballots,k∈Keys,n∈Nonces
sv→a(v, bcb, sv) · ra→v(sa) · sv→ch(cb, scb) ·
∑
L1∈List1,(cb,scb)∈L1
rp→v(L1) · sv→ch({[b ]v}k, k) ·
∑
(L1,L2)∈List1×List2
rp→v(L1, L2).
The voter starts by (non-deterministically) selecting his ballot, key, and nonce.
Without making this explicit by the use of an internal event for this selection process,
we assume that this choice is completely under control of the voter. Moreover, we
require that diﬀerent voters select diﬀerent keys and diﬀerent nonces. After having
sent the ﬁrst message, the voter receives his blinded committed ballot, signed by the
administrator (sa). As an exception, this read event is not preceded by a summation.
The reason is that, although the voter cannot construct this message himself, it is
possible for him to verify whether the received datum satisﬁes the requirements.
Given a deterministic signing algorithm, there will be only one such term. The
ability to select only such validly signed term is expressed by the syntactic form of
the expansion of sa, which is siga(bcb), where bcb is known to the voter.
When the voter opens his ballot, by sending his key via the channel to the
counter, we will have to model that the vote which is to be opened is attributed to
this particular user. This attribution does not inﬂuence the behaviour of the system,
nor is it observable by the intruder. The only reason to include this attribution is
to enable the formal analysis of the system by determining the ballots that could be
possibly attributed to this voter. Please notice that we did not require the voters
to explicitly synchronize with the diﬀerent phases of the election. The only event
that can play this role is the reception of the lists from the publisher.
Admin(S) =
∑
v∈V,ϕ∈Terms rv→a(v, ϕ, sigv(ϕ)) ·sa→v(siga(ϕ)) ·Admin(S \ { v }).
The administration process is parameterized by the set of voters that still have to
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vote. After having sent a signed ballot to a voter, the user is deleted from this set.
Counter(L1, L2) =
∑
ϕ∈Terms rch→c(ϕ, siga(ϕ)) ·Counter(L1 ⊕ (ϕ, siga(ϕ)), L2)
+ sc→p(L1) · Counter
′(L1, L2)
Counter′(L1, L2) =
∑
ϕ∈π1(L1),k∈Keys,deck(ϕ)∈Ballots
rch→c(ϕ, k) ·Counter
′(L1, L2 ⊕ (ϕ, k,deck(ϕ)))
+ sc→p(L2).
The counter proceeds in two stages, which are modeled by two diﬀerent process
variables. In the ﬁrst stage the counter receives a term signed by the administrator.
The transition from the ﬁrst to the second stage is modeled in a non-deterministic
way. This allows us to validate the system in case the counter makes this transition
“too early”. In the second stage the counter accepts keys which allow him to
unpack the committed ballots. We remark that the condition ϕ ∈ π1(L1) should be
interpreted as not to take the user attribution in ϕ into account. The end of the
second stage is also modeled non-deterministically.
Channel(B) =
∑
v∈V,ϕ∈Terms rv→ch(ϕ) · Channel(B ⊕ {ϕ})
+
∑
ϕ∈B sch→c(ϕ) · Channel(B  {ϕ}).
The anonymous channel receives messages from a voter, which are added to the
buﬀer. Alternatively, the channel can select any message from the buﬀer and pass
it on to the counter.
Publisher(L1, L2) =
∑
L′
1
∈List1 rc→p(L
′
1) · Publisher
′(L′1, L2)
Publisher′(L1, L2) = ‖v∈V sp→v(L1) ‖ rc→p(L
′
2) · Publisher
′′(L1, L
′
2)
Publisher′′(L1, L2) = ‖v∈V sp→v(L1, L2).
The publisher process accepts a list from the counter and sends it to all voters. In
the course of publishing the ﬁrst list, the publisher can also receive the second list,
after which this list gets distributed too.
Finally, we specify the complete system FOO as the parallel composition of all
its agents. Hence,
FOO = ∂H(‖v∈V Voter(v) ‖ Admin(V) ‖ Counter(∅, ∅) ‖ Channel(∅) ‖ Publisher(∅)).
We initialize the administrator with the set of all voters, and the other processes
with empty lists and buﬀers. The communication function matches read and sent
events, i.e.
sx→y(ϕ) | rx→y(ϕ) = cx→y(ϕ)
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for x, y ∈ Dest and ϕ ∈ Terms. The events cx→y(ϕ) are the concrete versions of
the abstract events 〈x, y, ϕ〉 introduced in Section 2. The set H of encapsulated or
forbidden events is given by
H = { sx→y(ϕ), rx→y(ϕ) | x, y ∈ Dest, ϕ ∈ Terms }.
The set of traces traces(FOO) of the speciﬁed system now easily follows by apply-
ing the familiar operational semantics described in e.g. [5]. The deﬁnition of the
anonymous channel requires that its input events cannot be observed by the in-
truder. Therefore, we deﬁne the set of observable events Obs = { cx→y(ϕ) | (x, y) =
(v, ch), ϕ ∈ Terms }. We will not provide a precise deﬁnition of the initial intruder
knowledge I. The reason is that we will consider the situation where all voters are
trusted, as well as the situation in which some voters may be untrusted. Untrusted
voters will be modeled by assuming that their chosen ballot, key and nonce are in
the initial knowledge of the intruder.
4 The FOO Attribution Set
For the characterization of the attribution set of a voter we need an auxiliary def-
inition. The predicate acmatch(i, t) holds true iﬀ in trace t upto position i the
number of blinded votes signed by the administrator exactly matches the number
of covered votes received by the counter. The speciﬁc property of an index i such
that acmatch(i, t), in a trace t of the FOO system, is that voters that have been
registered no later than position i in t must have sent one of the covered votes
collected by the counter upto this point.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The predicate acmatch is given by
acmatch(i, t) ⇐⇒ i ≤ len(t) ∧
#{ j | j < i ∧ ∃v, sa : t[j] = ca→v(sa) } =
#{ j | j ≤ i ∧ ∃cb, scb : t[j] = cch→c(cb, scb) }.
The set of indices chunk(i, t) for an index i and trace t such that i ≤ len(t) is given
by
{ j | (j < i → h : j ≤ h < i ∧ acmatch(h, t)) ∧
(i < j → h : i ≤ h < j ∧ acmatch(h, t)) }.
It holds that, if j ∈ chunk(i, t) and t[j] is a registration sent by the administrator
or a covered vote received by the counter, than t[j] is matched by a corresponding
covered vote or registration t[h], respectively, with h ∈ chunk(i, t).
Given the above deﬁnition we are in a position to precisely describe the attri-
bution set of a voter v with respect to a trace t of FOO. The characterization
theorem 4.2 states that the attribution set of a voter v with respect to a trace t
of FOO contains a ballot b if a covered vote, that apparently carried b, has been
received by the counter in the same chunk as v’s registration. Moreover, voter v
could possibly not have voted at all (either because her covered vote or her opening
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did not reach the counter in time) if a registration of a voter in the chunk of v
remains unmatched, or all registrations of voters in the chunk of v are matched but
not all are opened in the end.
Theorem 4.2 For all v ∈ V and t ∈ traces(FOO) it holds that
ASt(v) =
{ b | ∃i, j, , sa , scb, k, v′ :
t[i] = ca→v(sa) ∧
i < j ∧ j ∈ chunk(i, t) ∧
t[j] = cch→c({b}k, scb) ∧
t[] = cch→c({[b ]v′}k, k) } ∪
{ ⊥ | ∃i, sa :
t[i] = ca→v(sa) ∧
j : i < j ∧ acmatch(j, t) } ∪
{ ⊥ | ∃i, j, sa , cb, scb, k :
t[i] = ca→v(sa) ∧
i < j ∧ j ∈ chunk(i, t) ∧
t[j] = cch→c(cb, scb)∧
 : t[] = cch→c(cb, k))) }
Proof. Directly from Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.8 below. 
So, Theorem 4.2 states that the attribution set ASt(v) of a voter v with respect to
a trace t of the FOO system, contains a vote b iﬀ
• the registration of v of her blinded committed vote bcb is conﬁrmed by the ad-
ministrator, i.e. v receives sa = siga(bcb), at some position i in t,
• at some position j in t, the counter received a covered vote {b}k together with
the administrator’s signature scb for {b}k
• that could have matched the registration conformation at position i, i.e. the
position j is later than i in t and is in the same chunk of t as i is,
• whereas the opening of the covered vote {b}k, i.e. the receipt of the counter of
the pair ({b}k, k), at some position  in t, yields the vote b.
The special element ⊥ is included in ASt(v) iﬀ the registration of voter v was
conﬁrmed by the administrator at position i in t, but
• registrations and deposits of committed ballots where never in balance since then,
i.e. for no position j later than i in t the predicate acmatch(j, t) holds, so that
voter v may not have sent her vote to the counter at all or that her vote was lost
underway, or,
• there is a committed ballot that could match v’s registration, i.e. for some posi-
tion j later than i and in the same chunk as i in t, which is never opened, i.e. the
corresponding key k never reached the counter.
Note that an opening ({b}k, k) as described above, may originate from a voter v
′
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diﬀerent from v. Thus, with the meta-level annotation to attribute data to users in
processes (not interpreted at the process level) the action cch→c({[b ]v′}k, k) occurs
at position  in the trace t, rather then cch→c({[b ]v}k, k) or cch→c({b}k, k).
The two inclusions underlying a proof of the theorem have been split over two
lemmas. First we collect a few properties of the traces of FOO that follow straight-
forward from the deﬁnitions.
Lemma 4.3
(a) b ∈v t iﬀ ∃i : t[i] = cch→c({[b ]v}k, k).
(b) t[i] = cch→c({[b ]v}k, k) implies ∃g, h, n :
g < h < i ∧ t[h] = cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)) ∧ t[g] = ca→v(siga({b}k ∗ n)). 
The next lemma states that acmatch and hence chunk respect the equivalence ∼I .
The lemma follows from the observation that the matching is based on the sender-
receiver information and the form, not the content, of events.
Lemma 4.4 Suppose t ∼I t
′ and k ∈ know(I, t). If t[i] = cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)) ∧
acmatch(i, t) then ∃i′ : t′[i′] = cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)) ∧ acmatch(i
′, t′). 
Next we prove half of the characterization theorem.
Lemma 4.5 Let RHSt(v) be short for the concrete characterization of ASt(v) as
given by Theorem 4.2. Then it holds that ASt(v) ⊆ RHSt(v), for every voter v and
trace t of FOO.
Proof. Let t ∈ FOO and v ∈ V. Assume b ∈ ASt(v). Pick t
′ ∈ traces(FOO)
such that t′ ∼I t and b ∈v t
′. From Lemma 4.3 we obtain that t′[i′] =
ca→v(siga({b}k ∗ n)), t
′[j′] = cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)) and t
′[′] = cch→c({[b ]v}k, k)
for some indices i′, j′ and ′ and suitable key k and nonce n. Note k ∈ know(I, t′),
so the term {[b ]v}k can be interpreted. Since t ∼I t
′ if follows that, for suitable
indices i, j and , t[i] = ca→v(ϕ), t[j] = cch→c(ψ), t[] = cch→c(ρ) for terms ϕ,
ψ and ρ that correspond to siga({b}k ∗ n), ({b}k, siga({b}k)) and ({[b ]v}k, k), re-
spectively. From the deﬁnition of the administrator and voter processes of FOO it
follows that ϕ = siga({b
′}k′ ∗ n
′) for some ballot b′, key k′ and nonce n′, as this is
the only type of communication from the administrator to voter v. Since both ψ
and ρ can be completely interpreted by the intruder modulo the user attribution, we
get that ψ = ({b}k, siga({b}k)) and ρ = ({[b ]v′}k, k) for some voter v
′. It remains
to show that j ∈ chunk(i, t). As i′ and j′ match in t′, this follows from Lemma 4.4
since t ∼I t
′.
Assume ⊥ ∈ ASt(v). Pick again t
′ ∈ FOO such that t′ ∼I t and ⊥ ∈v t
′.
We distinguish two cases: (i) voter v did only register; (ii) voter v sent in her
covered vote, but did not open it. In the ﬁrst case, we have, for some index i and
suitable b, k and n, t′[i] = ca→v(siga({b}k ∗ n)) but for no index j, j > i, it holds
that t′[j] = cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)). So, t
′[j] remains unmatched. In the second
case, we can pick indices i and j such that t′[i] = ca→v(siga({b}k ∗ n)), t
′[j] =
cch→c({b}k, siga({b}k)). As t
′[i] and t′[j] match, it follows that j ∈ chunk(i, t′). By
the assumption on unique keys and ⊥ ∈v t
′ we derive that for no index  it holds
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that t′[] = cch→c({[b ]v}k, k). Exploitation of the equivalence t ∼I t
′, similar to
the reasoning above, yields corresponding indices of t. It follows that ⊥ ∈ RHSt(v)
too. 
For the proof of the other half of Theorem 4.2 we need a combinatorial result.
Suppose a’s and b’s come in pairs with the a of a pair preceding the corresponding b
(such as registrations and covered votes in traces of FOO). In general, one can not
change the arrangements of pairs without disturbing the precedence. E.g., in the
trace a1a2b1b2 we can swap b1 and b2 while maintaining a1 ≺ b1 and a2 ≺ b2, but
in a1b1a2b2 we cannot. Roughly speaking, as long as some a is in the same chunk
as any b with a ≺ b, we can ﬁnd a pairing containing a pair of the occurrences of
the particular a and b that respects the precedence.
Lemma 4.6 Let w be a string of length 2s in which the symbols ar, br, for 1 ≤ r ≤
s, all occur exactly once. If
(i) ar occurs before br, for all r, 1 ≤ r ≤ s, and
(ii) w has no proper preﬁx with an equal number of a’s and b’s
then, for any two p, q, 1 ≤ p<q ≤ s, there exists a permutation π of {1, . . . , s} such
that π(q) = p for which the string w′ obtained from w by replacing each br by bπ(r)
satisﬁes properties (i) and (ii).
Proof. Induction on s. Base case, s = 1: trivial. Induction step, s + 1: Pick
indices p and q, 1 ≤ p < q ≤ s + 1. If aq occurs before bp swapping of bp and bq
clearly satisﬁes the claim. So, suppose bp occurs before aq in w. By condition (ii),
for some r it holds that bp occurs between ar and br. The string w
′ of length 2s
obtained from w by ﬁrst applying the swapping of bp and br and then removing
the pair ar, br satisﬁes the two conditions. By induction hypothesis, there exists
a permutation π on {1, . . . , s + 1}\r and a corresponding string w′′ satisfying (i)
and (ii). The permutation π′ that extends π with π′(r) = r and the string w′′′
obtained from w′′ by inserting the pair ar, br back again veriﬁes the claim. 
Example 4.7 Put a1 = w, a2 = x, a3 = y, a4 = z and b1 = W , b2 = X,
b3 = Y , b4 = Z. The string wxXyzZY W satisﬁes the requirements (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 4.6 above. For indices 1 and 2, we can simply swap W and X obtaining
wzWyzZY X for a permutation that maps 1 to 2. For the indices 2 and 4, we
cannot, on wxXyzZY W , do a similar swapping of X and Z, as z would then no
longer preceed Z. Therefore, we use W as auxilliary permuting element by mapping
2 to 4 (as intended) and 4 to 1, 1 to 2 yielding wxWyzXY Z.
We next prove the remaining part of the characterization of FOO’s attribution set.
Lemma 4.8 It holds that RHSt(v) ⊆ ASt(v), for every voter v and trace t of FOO.
Proof. Suppose t ∈ FOO and v ∈ V. Pick b ∈ RHSt(v). We consider
the typical case that v timely submits its covered vote and opening, leaving the
other two degenerate cases to the reader. Choose suitable indices, data elements
and voter v′ such that t[i′] = ca→v(siga({b
′}k′ ∗ n)), t[j] = cch→c({b}k, scb),
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t[] = cch→c({[b ]v′}k, k), t[i] = ca→v′(siga({b}k ∗ n)), t[j
′] = cch→c({b
′}k′ , scb
′) and
t[′] = cch→c({[b
′ ]v}k′ , k
′). Moreover, i < j and j ∈ chunk(i, t). By the matching
lemma 4.6 we can arrange for a trace t′ of FOO such that t′ ∼I t and voter v
submits a covered vote containing b. It follows that b ∈ ASt(v).
Suppose ⊥ ∈ RHSt(v). Suppose data that t[i] = ca→v(siga({b}k ∗ n)) and for
no j, j > i, it holds that acmatch(j, t), for suitable indices. Then there exists h ∈
chunk(i, t) such that t[h] = ca→v′(siga({b
′}k′ ∗ n
′)), but t[j] = cch→c({b
′}k′ , scb
′)
for no j. Hence, for no , t[] = cch→c({[b
′ ]v′}k′ , k
′). By rearranging the activity
of v and v′ we ﬁnd a trace t′ ∈ FOO such that t ∼I t
′ and, for no , t′[] =
cch→c({[b
′ ]v}k′ , k
′). Thus ⊥ ∈v t
′ and ⊥ ∈ ASt(v). The other case is similar and
omitted. 
5 Vulnerability Analysis
In this section we interpret the results above and discuss (potential) vulnerabilities
of the FOO voting scheme. Rather than providing a yes/no answer to the question
whether the FOO voting scheme satisﬁes the privacy requirement claimed by Fu-
jioka, Okamoto and Ohta, we have calculated the set of all ballots that could be
attributed to a given user. There are several ways in which we can use this infor-
mation to assess the vulnerability of the FOO voting scheme to privacy attacks.
Synchronization
The precise description provided by Theorem 4.2 is a starting point to look
for ways to inﬂuence the privacy of the voter beneﬁcially. In order to avoid the
situation that votes are being submitted to the counter while voters are still able
to register, Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta suggest, as modeled in [35], to synchronize
the registration, sending and opening of ballots of voters. However, the authors
of [25] make not explicit which synchronizations are essential. The same applies to
the privacy analysis that is part of [35].
One can distinguish three phases in the voting process: all registration takes
place before any sending of ballots; openings are sent only after all votes have
been sent in. This can be arranged by having explicit time lines. Looking at our
speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd two places where synchronization may be implemented. The
ﬁrst way to synchronize aﬀects the behaviour of the voters: they will have to wait
until a certain deadline has passed before they submit their vote to the anonymous
channel. After this deadline they will not try to register anymore. Disadvantage,
when elections take place at a large scale, is that voter processes span a relatively
large time frame. This may be undesirable from a usability point of view if such is
at the responsibility of each individual voter. Therefore, as our formal speciﬁcation
facilitates, it is better to have the synchronization at another place, viz. to have
the anonymous channel in charge for this. The anonymous channel speciﬁed above
already starts producing output while still accepting input. One can adapt the
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process such that it ﬁrst collects all inputs and only then starts to transmit:
Channel(B) =
∑
v∈V,ϕ∈Terms rv→ch(ϕ) · Channel(B ⊕ {ϕ}) + Channel
′(B)
Channel ′(B) =
∑
ϕ∈B sch→c(ϕ) · Channel
′(B  {ϕ}).
(Further details to deal with time or voter counting have been suppressed here.)
This implements a synchronization point and solves the problem. Note that, the
solution boils down to the plain old ballot box which may only be opened for
counting after collection of the votes.
Active intruder
Taking the intruder’s perspective the goal is to minimize the attribution set for a
(or any) voter. In case of a malicious administrator in a non-synchronized system,
he can distinguish the ballot of the ﬁrst voter by delaying all other voters until
the ﬁrst voter’s ballot is transmitted by the anonymous channel. If time allows to
repeat this process, the intruder can jeopardize the privacy of all voters.
In a synchronized system, though, at the publisher side a similar attack is possi-
ble for an active intruder, i.e. a malicious party that also adapts the information sent
out to voters: Instead of presenting the voters with the correct list L1 of commit-
ted ballots, the intruder blocks this communication (or takes over control over the
publisher process) and sends a speciﬁc voter v1 with a list with only one entry from
the original list and all other entries garbled. All voters diﬀerent from v1 receive
a completely garbled list. Now two cases should be distinguished: the remaining
entry indeed was the covered vote of v1 or it was not. In the former case, v1 will be
the only voter sending in his opening, since the other voters will miss their covered
votes from the list. In the latter case, all voter processes block as their covered
votes are missing. Thus, for a population of n voters, chances are 1 out of n that
the privacy of a single voter, v1 in our case, is compromised. In the possibilistic
stance this amounts to stating that an active intruder has for any voter a trace that
violates the voter’s anonymity.
Although havoc may result from complaints of voters missing their covered votes
from the published list, one may even try to stretch the approach a bit further.
Instead of only presenting voter v1 with a list with only one valid entry, now voter v1
gets a list that is scrambled except for entry e1, voter v2 gets a list that is scrambled
except for entry e2, and so on. The qualitative interpretation then yields that the
intruder has a trace in which all votes are revealed. However, as a variation of
the well-known drunker sailor problem [38], it follows, by linearity of expectation,
that the expectation of the number of voters of which the privacy is breached is 1
only, thus showing no improvement (from the intruder’s perspective) on the earlier
attack. Due to their modeling of the privacy requirement, the analysis of the FOO
protocol by Kremer and Ryan [35] did not reveal this weakness. In future work we
aim at providing a precise analysis in which a Dolev-Yao intruder is modeled at the
same level as the present representation of the processes involved.
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Dummy votes
An alternative manner to enlarge the voter’s attribution set is by exploiting
the anonymous channel. Before any activity of voters, the anonymous channel
accumulates a suﬃcient amount of signed dummy ballots from the administrator
in the same way an eligible voter would do. Note that, the administrator is aware
of the number of dummy votes that is generated this way. Next, when a regular
voter presents a blinded committed vote to the anonymous channel, the channel not
only outputs any of the regular votes it chooses, but also arbitrary many of its own
registered dummy votes. The team of administrator and counter will not be able
to tell the dummy votes and regular votes apart. As soon as the counter publishes
the blinded committed vote on the ﬁrst list of received votes, the voter can submit
its opening without endangering its privacy.
The reason of the increased privacy lies in the size of the chunks, or rather,
chunk. The predicate acmatch will only hold after the last bit of dummy votes have
come out of the channel. if plenty of these are at disposal of the channel, this can
be prolongated well after the last voter has sent in both its blinded vote and the
opening thereof. Therefore the attribution set of all voters will be the set of all
opened votes, together with ⊥, if applicable.
As is to be expected, the increased anonymity without a two or three phase vot-
ing regime comes at a price. The anonymous channel needs to be trusted, not only
for prudence when dealing with private information as before, but also regarding the
very outcome of the election. Obviously, the channel can cover the number of votes
for any option on its part and open this after the votes have been collected. The net
outcome will then be the grand total per option minus the number of dummy votes
for this option. However, there is a priori no guarantee that the channel will deliver
the votes it commits itself to, as long as there is no control mechanism in place for
this. It is conjectured that zero-knowledge techniques can help here, a topic for fur-
ther investigation. It is noted though, that the formal description of the attribution
set as given by Theorem 4.2 has catalyzed the above line of reasoning, that is, to
our best knowledge, not conceived before.
Unlinkability
One of the drawbacks of a formal veriﬁcation is the fact that it considers a for-
mal object, rather than an actual implementation. While implementing the protocol
many decisions have to be made, e.g. with respect to the actual cryptographic prim-
itives. A concrete cryptographic algorithm may have certain properties, which in a
particular setting could be used by an intruder to his advantage. In the FOO voting
scheme anonymity of the voter essentially depends on the unlinkability between two
events: the sending of a blinded committed ballot to the administrator and the
sending of the committed ballot (and its corresponding key) to the counter. Now, if
the implementation allows an observer to link these events, anonymity is breached.
Such vulnerabilities could e.g. be introduced by naive use of a probabilistic sign-
ing algorithm or by including network information of the voter in the payload of
messages and thus to travel unmodiﬁed through the supposedly anonymous channel.
S. Mauw et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 5–2824
In case a Public Key Infrastructure is adopted when implementing the FOO vot-
ing scheme, then also possibilities might emerge for linking the blinded committed
ballot bcb to the committed ballot cb. More speciﬁcally, one could think of an im-
plementation of the FOO voting scheme where the administrator sends the signed
blinded committed vote to the voter together with its public key and corresponding
certiﬁcate. The certiﬁcate was created by the Certiﬁcation Authority (CA). The
voter can check the validity and integrity of the received public key by checking the
corresponding certiﬁcate.
If the CA is not strictly separated from the administrator, then an attack is
possible in the following way: The administrator generates a public/secret key pair
for each voter and asks the CA to generate a certiﬁcate for each public key. The
administrator signs the blinded committed ballot of each voter with a diﬀerent secret
key. He sends the signed blinded committed vote together with the corresponding
public key and its certiﬁcate to the voter.
The voter checks the certiﬁcate of the received public key and veriﬁes the sig-
nature of the blinded committed vote. Subsequently, he unblinds the signature and
sends the unblinded signature to the counter. The counter (together with the ad-
ministrator) can determine the identity of the voter by ﬁnding out what public key
matches the received signature.
Another problem might arise if the administrator adopts a group signature
scheme. Group signatures, see e.g. [15], denote a signature scheme where each
member of a group can generate a signature. The receiver (i.e. the voter in our
case) cannot ﬁnd out what group member generated it. When the administrator
uses a group signature scheme he can act as a speciﬁc group member. Thus he has
got the possibility to generate a signature speciﬁc for a certain voter. This leads to
a link between the blinded committed ballot and the committed ballot.
Conspiring voters
In principle, a ﬂooding attack might be possible in the presence of malicious
and conspiring voters, aﬀecting the availability of the system. However, if the
system is synchronized in any of the two ways indicated above, conspiring agents
can hardly inﬂuence the privacy of other agents. In order to model conspiring
voters, we extend the initial intruder knowledge with the ballots, keys and nonces
of the malicious voters. Repeating the calculation of the attribution set with this
extended intruder knowledge will give a reduction of the attribution set as the
ballots from the conspiring voters can be identiﬁed and deleted. We will not provide
these calculations, since they are a straightforward extension of the case without
conspiring voters. Care has to be taken to deﬁne the acmatch predicate in order to
skip communications of the conspiring voters.
6 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the deﬁnition of an attribution set. This
set consists of all objects that can possibly be attributed to some user, given the
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observations of an intruder. It can be considered a measure for the data anonymity
of the user. If, for some system, this attribution set can be calculated in an explicit
form, it will give insight in the vulnerabilities of the system and it can be used to
strengthen the protocol.
The analysis of the FOO voting scheme clearly supports our view. Not only
did it show how an intruder could try to break anonymity, it also showed that a
synchronization point would solve the problem. We indicated two possibilities for
such a synchronization, one of which was not considered by the designers of the
FOO voting scheme. Our analysis also revealed some other possible weakness. If
the communication from the publisher process to the voters is compromised, the
intruder can manipulate this in such a way that at least one vote can be attributed
to its voter. Furthermore, a weakness occurs if the administrator can manipulate
the distribution of his public signing key.
Common experience with the use of formal methods shows that the act of for-
malizing clariﬁes the assumptions underlying the correctness of a system. The
original description by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta suﬀers from underspeciﬁcation
(the properties required from the anonymous channel are not made clear) as well
as from overspeciﬁcation (cryptographic algorithms are chosen, rather than their
relevant properties). Our speciﬁcation and analysis clariﬁed some of these issues.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First of all, our speciﬁcation
only considered the main operation of the protocol: whenever an unexpected sit-
uation occurs, the involved agent will simply deadlock. In the original description
such exceptions are treated in a more meaningful way. However, we think that
such exception handling is not essential for reaching privacy, but to satisfy other
properties. A second extension, as mentioned above, is to consider a Dolev-Yao
intruder modeled as a ﬁrst-class citizen, instead of an eavesdropping intruder as in
the present setting. Our current analysis hints at system ﬂaws in this setting, but
further work on modeling synchronization is needed to make this precise. A last
promising point for follow-up research is to look for zero-knowledge mechanisms for
a secure injection of dummy votes, so that the attribution set of all voters can be
maximized without putting unnecessary trust in the anonymous channel.
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